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Freedom of Expression in Secondary Schools
Ann Aldrich* and JoAnne V. Sommers**
G uzick v. Drebus,1 currently under consideration on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, raises impor-
tant questions concerning the application of the First Amendment to
secondary school students.
The case may well be typical of hundreds of other instances in which
a local school board, for one reason or another, has experienced difficulty
in giving full effect to the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement
on the subject. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District2 held that a school board regulation prohibiting the wearing of
black armbands to school in protest against the war in Vietnam was un-
constitutional. The wearing of symbols of political or controversial sig-
nificance, by high school students, in circumstances entirely divorced
from actual or potentially disruptive conduct, is constitutionally pro-
tected free speech.
The issue was ready for Supreme Court determination. The Dis-
trict Court had upheld the school board's regulation on the ground that
it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc,
was equally divided and the District Court's decision therefore affirmed,
without opinion.4
At about the same time, the Fifth Circuit had decided two cases
involving the same question. In Burnside v. Byars,5 the enforcement of
a prohibition against the wearing of freedom buttons to school by high
school students was held unconstitutional where there was no evidence
that the wearing of such buttons "materially and substantially interfered
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school." On the same day, the same panel, in Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Board of Education,6 applying the same legal principle, reached
an opposite conclusion, declining to enjoin the enforcement of a similar
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University.
** B.S., Bowling Green State Univ.; Third-year student, Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law, Cleveland State Univ.; Secondary School social worker in Cleveland.
1 Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. C 69-209, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, May 6, 1969. (Case No. 19,681, on
appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.)
2 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ia. 1966).
4 383 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967); cert. granted 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
5 363 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
6 363 F. 2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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school regulation where the students wearing freedom buttons harassed
students who did not wear them, and created considerable disturbance
and disruption. The lower court in Tinker had expressly refused to
follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in Burnside.
The Guzick Case-Inadvertent Racial Refinement of Tinker?
Within two weeks of the Tinker decision, startlingly similar facts
launched another high school case.
Tom Guzick was seventeen, in the eleventh grade, and one of some
two thousand students at Shaw High, a public school in East Cleveland,
Ohio. On March 10, 1969, Tom Guzick wore a peace button to school.






The message on the button referred to a forthcoming demonstration
against the war in Vietnam. A permit to march had been obtained by
the demonstrators from the City of Chicago; the march was to be entirely
peaceful and confrontations of any kind were to be avoided.7
At the end of his uneventful school day, Guzick was asked about his
peace button by two fellow-students; his reply prompted only a casual
answer.
The following day Guzick and a fifteen year-old friend, Hunter
Havens, a ninth grader, both came to school wearing the anti-war but-
tons. They went to Principal Drebus' office to inquire about distributing
leaflets at school and were advised that this was not permitted. The prin-
cipal ordered the boys to remove their buttons. Havens complied; Guzick
refused. Thereupon, Principal Drebus suspended Guzick from Shaw High
School until such time as he would return to school without his peace
button.
At no time during the button-wearing period did Guzick conduct
himself in a disorderly or improper manner; nor was there any disrup-
tion of, or interference with, the educational process at Shaw High
School.
On March 17th a suit was filed by Thomas Guzick, Sr., on behalf of
his son, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division. Named as defendants were the principal of Shaw
High School and (on the ground that they had, in their official capaci-
7 The demonstration did, in fact, take place as planned, without confrontation or vio-
lence. An estimated thirty-five thousand people gathered in Chicago on April 5,
including approximately five hundred persons from the Cleveland area, of which




ties, ratified, approved, or encouraged Principal Drebus' suspension of
Guzick) the members of the East Cleveland Board of Education, and the
Superintendent of the East Cleveland School District.
The complaint, filed pursuant to the provisions of Title 42, U.S.C.A.
§ 1983,8 alleged that the suspension deprived Guzick of his right to wear
his peace button, a right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution; and that, as similar buttons are worn by
students in other high schools in the Cleveland area, Guzick was also
deprived of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also
alleged that his son's suspension was without just cause, without a hear-
ing, and without due process of law. However, as the procedural due
process issue was not ruled upon by the District Court, nor pressed on
appeal, it is not discussed here.0
Guzick sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with his
right to wear the button while attending school, and from refusing to
reinstate him at Shaw; the complaint also asked for a declaratory judg-
ment that any rule or regulation of the East Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion prohibiting the wearing of such buttons is unconstitutional.
After five days of evidentiary hearing, ending on March 26, 1969, the
District Court found for the defendants and dismissed Guzick's com-
plaint.
8 This section, which also served as the jurisdictional base in the Tinker case, pro-
vides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
9 The issue is dealt with extensively in Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School
Dismissals, 20 CWRU L. Rev. 380 (1969). Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Edu-
cation, 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La. 1968) is typical of the trend:
As an enlargement on previous decisions, we strongly recommend that dis-
ciplinary rules and regulations adopted by a school board be set forth in writing
and promulgated . . . to reach all parties subjected [thereto] .... Moreover we
recommend that each disciplinary procedure incorporate some system of ap-
peal....
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); and
Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) are the lead-
ing procedural due process cases.
For an excellent discussion of due process vis-a-vis the high school student, see
Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York, 267 F. Supp. 356, 369 (S.D. N.Y.
1967), rev'd., 386 F. 2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
For a comprehensive coverage of the subject at the college level, see Seavey,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (1957); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968); and the widely
consulted product of New York University School of Law's Research Seminar on
Student Conduct and Discipline, Student Conduct and Discipline Proceedings in a
University Setting, New York University School of Law (1968). See also two of the
leading cases, Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.-Col. 1968) and Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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The Court specifically found that the "button at issue in the instant
case did not convey an inflammatory message"; and that although there
was evidence (i.e., the opinion of one of the school officials) that the mes-
sage conveyed by this particular button might be such as to inflame some
of the students at Shaw High, the Court could not agree, nor find, that
such a result was likely.'0
The Court did find, however, that if this button were permitted, ad-
ministrative difficulty in "applying a selective rule" "1 would require that
permission be granted for the wearing of all sorts of other buttons, and
the wearing of these other buttons would "exacerbate a type of racial
tension which is peculiar to Shaw." 12 The conditions "peculiar to Shaw"
were specifically detailed by the court as follows:
a) the institution is not new; it includes many old buildings with
corridors and connecting tunnels, built for fewer students, which
are now congested;
b) the neighborhood, at one time an almost exclusively white com-
munity, has become during the last few years, a racially mixed
community;
c) approximately seventy percent of the students are black; thirty
percent are white;
d) there has been considerable friction between the students of the
two races as well as among students of the same race;
e) however, there has not, as yet, been a serious racial disturbance
at Shaw High School;
f) John Hay High School, one mile to the west, and predominately
black (99%), suffered repeated disturbances and was forced to
close for several days, though not as the result of racial incidents
between students; and
g) three additional nearby high schools with large percentages of
black students have had serious disturbances. 3
These, then, are the conditions creating that "peculiar racial tension"
deemed sufficient, by the Guzick court, to justify its refusal to follow
the decision in Tinker.
As both cases were characterized by, and limited to, orderly be-
havior, without any actual disruption of either school's educational
process, the practical result of the Guzick court's rationale, though per-
1o Opinion, supra n. 1 at 14.
11 Id. at 16.
12 Id. at 11.
'3 Id. at 4-5. The Opinion did not refer to uncontradicted testimony of defendant's
witnesses elicited on cross examination that Shaw students are "no less mature, intel-ligent, or reasonable" than students at other schools in the Cleveland area, where




haps inadvertent, is logically inescapable. The right to express one's
point of view on a politically controversial issue (such as the Vietnam
war), in an orderly fashion, is constitutionally protected in a racially
homogenous high school in Des Moines, Iowa;14 the same right is pro-
hibited to students in a high school in racially tense East Cleveland, Ohio.
The majority in Tinker held that mere "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance" is not enough to abridge a student's right to
orderly freedom of expression, and classified the following as no more
than examples of such undifferentiated fear: the feeling that something
"difficult to control" might evolve because a former student was killed
in Vietnam and some of his friends were still in school; rumors that other
students would "wear armbands of other colors if the black bands pre-
vailed;" the fact that debate over the Vietnam war had become "vehe-
ment" or "violent" in many localities; and that a wave of draft-card burn-
ings had swept the country.15 The Court specifically noted "it was not
fear of disruption that motivated the regulation prohibiting armbands.
• . . School authorities simply felt that the schools are no place for dem-
onstrations." 16
A search of the Opinion and the trial record in Guzick provides
nothing more effective. There is a similar reference to the possible ill
effect on friends or relatives of former students killed in Vietnam;
17
a like reference to "other buttons" which will be worn in retaliation;' 8
and similar references to vehement reactions in other localities or other
schools. 19
Although the original motivation behind the "no-button" regulation
at Shaw may have been the prevention of disruption by exuberant high
school fraternities 30 years ago, the present absolute prohibition against
the wearing of insignia or buttons is no more related to a fear of specific
interference with the educational process than was the hastily adopted
prohibition against armbands in Tinker.20 Principal Drebus testified that
the rule is absolute:
14 Tinker involved no "racial overtones." In a telegraphic reply to the authors, the
superintendent of the Des Moines school board stated, "Color had no bearing on this
case."
15 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, supra n. 2 at 509
n. 3.
16 Id.
17 Testimony by one of defendant-school board members. (R. 512).
18 Opinion, supra n. 1, at 14.
19 Id.
20 Distinguishing Guzick from Tinker (see Opinion, supra n. 1 at 22) on the ground
that the Shaw High regulation prohibiting buttons is one of long standing, even-
handedly applied whereas the regulation in Tinker, on short notice, prohibited only
the symbolic expression against the Vietnam war, is not relevant. Clothing a rule
with age does not alter the nakedness of the wrong. Both school regulations are arbi-
trary because they prohibit constitutionally protected free expression unaccompanied
by any disorder or disturbance, actual or nascent, of the school or of the rights of
(Continued on next page)
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• . . the test is not whether there is any interference with classroom
activity, it is just a flat policy.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
If Guzick is affirmed, a racial refinement will have been engrafted
onto the holding in Tinker; integration, per se, will thereby have been
deemed tantamount to "differentiated fear." If secondary school officials
can, on the basis of integration, alone, not only supervise but also totally
prohibit the flow of ideas deemed "too emotional and controversial," then
opportunities for learning in practical democracy will indeed have been
severely curtailed-and curtailed in the very schools whose students most
need experience in adjusting comfortably to an inter-racial world.
It is on precisely those issues which stir up emotion and contro-
versy and in precisely those parts of the country where they are
most emotional and controversial, that rational discussion is most
needed; and the sooner it can begin in the educational process the
better off the country will be.22
Guzick and Tinker-Theories of Education and the Law
One of the most zealously cherished Tenth Amendment powers re-
served to the individual states has been their right, through local school
boards and school officials, to provide for the education of the young.
Theories of education (i.e., what shall be taught, by teachers of what
particular qualifications, with what special emphasis, approach, and gen-
eral educational aim) have been stamped with a peculiar provincialism.
Differences in geography, climate, economic pursuit, ethnic background
and education all combine to ensure great divergence of attitude from
community to community. The only certainty is that whatever the spe-
cial point of view, it will be tenaciously supported and usually by indi-
viduals of closed mind and open mouth. Even the dull-witted and the
timid become self-appointed, vociferous experts when the issues at stake
involve the education of their children.
This total local control over the education of the young is, on occa-
sion, challenged by a student, a parent or a teacher asserting (ordinarily)
a First Amendment right which collides with local policy, practice or
regulation. The judiciary, called upon to vindicate the alleged right
hence becomes involved, albeit unwittingly and certainly not by choice,
in educational theory and practice.
(Continued from preceding page)
other students. If the suppression of views on one particular political controversy
under such circumstances is unconstitutional (Tinker), then the suppression of all
political expression, in advance, is a fortiori, unconstitutional. Accord: Hammond v.South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (rights of university
students to peaceably demonstrate) discussed in Note, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968)
at 1131.
21 Drebus' testimony (R. 25).




To their credit, the judges have been consciously aware that the
judiciary ought not, under the guise of securing First Amendment rights,
in effect assume the task of "running" the local public schools.
Justice Black is not alone in his concern that upholding a high school
student's right to freedom of expression will involve the Court in a snow-
balling operation, when secondary "school pupils are not wise enough,
even with the Court's expert help from Washington, to run the 23,390
public school systems in the 50 States." 23 On the other hand, the Gault
case seems to have established in the minds of most of us, including Mr.
Justice Black, the fact that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for the benefit of adults alone.
24
Judicial divergence of opinion has traditionally stemmed primarily
from judges' divergent philosophies of law-what it is, or ought to be.
The opinions in Guzick and Tinker are striking because the divergence
of judicial opinion appears to be based less on differences in legal view-
point than on differences of opinion on theories of education. Apparently
judges, like everyone else, tend to express themselves with strong emo-
tional overtones when the question involves educating children.
The majority in Tinker, on the one hand, and Black's dissent and the
opinion in Guzick on the other, are graphic in juxtaposing two entirely
different views on the theory of education, and the respective roles to
be played by both students and teachers.
Justice Black is not merely impatient with high school students'
involvement in controversial political issues; he is exasperated. In his
view, the solution to "students all over the land ... running loose, con-
ducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins . . ." is a return to old-
fashioned school discipline, and old-fashioned parental control. Students
are to be repressed at least long enough to sit still, keep their minds on
their work, and acquire educations.25
The Guzick court, more paternalistic and protective, hence deeply
concerned about the ability of teen-agers to make sound decisions and
resist unsound temptations, similarly approves relatively repressive
school regulations for the sole reason that more permissive rules might
result in distraction from studies and in discipline run amuk.
A focus on the problem from the traditional adversary approach of
the law necessitates solving a question of balance: the extent to which
First Amendment rights to freedom of expression shall be secured for
secondary school students, balanced against the right of the community
to control education, which presupposes the enforcement of sufficient
23 Dissenting, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, et al.
supra n. 2, at 516.
24 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 Dissent, supra n. 23 at 515.
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regulation to provide that discipline necessary for the day-to-day oper-
ation of the schools.
An approach based on educational, rather than legal, theory pro-
vides a different focus-the concern need not be "adversary"; rather it
proceeds from a primary concentration on the conditions that must be
ensured in order to provide young people with the optimum in training
and education.
Before espousing, with Justice Black, a return to old-fashioned
values, it is relevant to consider briefly some of the "extra-legal" changes
emphasized by scholars from other disciplines, changes which may indi-
cate that we may well be disappointed in the results that can be achieved
by returning to "the old, the tried and the true."
a) The secondary school student. A product of his present day
elementary school curriculum, he is-compared to his father or grand-
father at the same age-larger physically; is reaching adolescence sooner;
is more widely read; is more involved with current issues; is better edu-
cated sooner, and will reach intellectual and emotional maturity earlier.
The survey of instructional practices reported in the National Edu-
cational Association Project . . . showed as one of the most wide-
spread changes the teaching of a number of subjects at an earlier
age... over one half of all secondary-school principals reported this
trend . . . over 1/5 of the schools were teaching certain mathematics
courses at lower grades than . . . previously. Science, reading and
social studies were also taught . . . at an earlier age . . . more than
of the secondary schools have moved courses to lower years. The
downward movement of courses has created room in the curriculum
in the upper grades for new, more advanced courses, thus making
possible the introduction of material formerly reserved for college.
... (Emphasis supplied.) 26
b) Technological change. It has become in the nature of a clich6
to dwell upon the remarkably burgeoning technology of our age, or to
suggest that we are totally unprepared to face most of the problems of
today partly because not even the theory underlying the technology that
creates them was in existence when we went to school. Yesterday's
knowledge is no longer today's truth. For example, we learned about
a simple and solid physical law concept-gravity; we now have had to
adjust to the fact that "what goes up must come down" is no longer truth
-it just may go into orbit.
26 Project on the Instructional Program of the Public Schools, The Principals Look
at the Schools, NEA 1962, quoted in Curriculum Planning by Saylor & Alexander,(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966). An interesting contrast in generation-
gap education is provided by White, The Making of the President, 1968. The com-
parison is between Lyndon Johnson's schooling & textbooks (at 112-116) (providing
moral certainty about many issues) and the "clean-for-Gene group," (at 78-101)
(who share a certainty only about the relativeness of things).
See also Keniston, The Young Radicals-Note on Committed Youth, passim, and




c) The knowledge explosion. In contrast to the unilinear techno-
logical change which may be recorded by each of us, is the sum total of
a geometric, rather than an arithmetic, progression in the totality of
man's knowledge. The concept implies both mass of information, and the
rapidity with which it accumulates. 27 There was a time when philos-
ophers worth their salt were able to know enough about all the disci-
plines to develop philosophies that embraced all. We have become a race
of experts; our knowledge of the trees has become so complicated that
only the computers can retain it all, and so far the computers have not
been able to provide humanized philosophies of the forests.
The important conclusion is that today's secondary student was born
into the world of technological change and knowledge explosion. He
takes them both for granted; hence he grows up anticipating as certainty
the fact that nothing he is taught will remain the same, that no institu-
tion is eternal, and that even his most basic concepts will have to be con-
tinuously questioned and revised. Times have changed, and theories of
education have necessarily changed too. It has increasingly come to be
recognized that an education is not a thing to be acquired, and that stu-
dents' minds are not empty buckets to be filled or blank pages on which
teachers and parents inscribe notes neatly. The day of the fanatic school
administrators frantically determined upon "keeping students like neat
ducks all in a row" is over.28 Education is now more generally viewed as
a process in which students must learn to participate; their minds serve
as tools which they will continue to use in what will be a life-long process
of re-education.
The majority opinion in Tinker reflects this view of education. Stu-
dents are guaranteed a right to self expression on controversial political
issues29 so long as the orderly process of education is not impaired. The
emphasis throughout the opinion is on the fact that no disturbances or
disorders occurred. The challenge, and the responsibility, are placed
where they belong-on the secondary school students themselves.
27 Keniston's nomenclature for the same phenomenon is the "historical speed-up."
Paper delivered at the Sixth Annual Arthur P. Noyes Memorial Conference, Phila-
delphia, October 11, 1969.
28 Comment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. of Public
Law 151 (1968).
29 We are not here concerned with non-constitutionally protected expression or de-
portment, such as short skirts, long hair, hot lunches, or cool music.
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"Correlative" First Amendment Rights of the Totality of Secondary
School Students
Although it has been suggested that "Too little attention has been
given to defining the purposes which the first amendment protection is
designed to achieve and to identifying the addressee of that protec-
tion," 30 there is in fact a long history of judicial recognition that the First
Amendment has a two-fold purpose, that it is intended as much for the
benefit of the listeners as for the speaker.
The dual purpose of the First Amendment was clearly described by
Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California.31 From the speaker's point of
view, he saw free expression as related to respect for public order:
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination:
... fear breeds repression; ... repression breeds hate; ... hate men-
aces stable government; ... the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies....
In more recent times, it has been pointed out that sit-ins and demon-
strations are a kind of communication by default.
... as critics of protest are eager and in a sense correct to say, the
prayer-singing student demonstration is the prelude to Watts. But
the difficulty with this criticism is that it wishes to throttle protest
rather than to recognize that protest has taken these forms because
it has had nowhere else to go.
3 2
The importance of this correlative public right to information and to
exposure to a variety of views was reiterated by Justice Murphy in
Thornhill v. Alabama: 33
. . .Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill the historic function
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period.
and by Justice Douglas in Dennis v. United States: 
34
• ..Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the
testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free dis-
cussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for
the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations apart.
30 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1641, 1648 (1967).
31 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
32 Supra n. 30, at 1647. Professor Barron is discussing the failure of the communica-
tions media to make itself adequately available to minority groups. The point is
equally valid applied to students subject to unduly repressive regulations controlling
free exchange of opinion.
33 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).




Perhaps the fullest expression of this "other-side-of-the-coin" right of the
majority is found in an encomium to Justice Black, written by the late
Professor Cahn: 3 ,
... The chief enemies of republican freedom are mental sloth, con-
formity, bigotry, superstitution, credulity, monopoly in the market
of ideas, and utter, benighted ignorance. Relying as it does on the
consent of the governed, representative government cannot succeed
unless the community receives enough information to grasp public
issues and make sensible decisions. As lights which may have been
enough for the past do not meet the needs of the present, so present
lights will not suffice for the more extensive and complex problems
of the future. Heretofore public enlightenment may have been only
a manifest desideratum; today it constitutes an imperative necessity.
The First Amendment . . . "reflects the faith that a good society
is not static but advancing, and that the fullest possible interchange
of ideas and beliefs is essential to attainment of this goal." 31
* . . What higher public interest is there than enlightenment of the
electors, and what higher social interest than the intellectual ad-
vancement of the community? Not alone the speaker, missionary,
writer or printer, has a stake in the First Amendment: the whole
conglomerate mass of the community audience is involved. Includ-
ing those who are almost sure they will never wish to speak and
those who are completely sure they do not wish to listen. Under
Black's doctrine, no one is required to listen, but even a unanimous
unwillingness to listen does not justify repression, for an advancing
society must be free to revise its judgement on this score as well as
on others. The audience has the indefinitely continuing right to be
exposed to an ideological variety: it will not be heard at any one
period of time to renounce exercising the right in other, future
periods. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same vein, writing for the majority in Marsh v. Alabama8 7
(holding that a Jehovah's witness could not be criminally punished for
distributing religious literature on the streets of a company-owned town
despite a sign saying "Private property-no solicitation") Justice Black
based his opinion not on the First Amendment right of the speaker, but
squarely on the correlative right of the listeners:
Many people in the United States live in company towns. These
people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their
state and country. Just as all other citizens they must make deci-
sions which affect the welfare of the community and nation. To act
35 Calm, The Firstness of the First Amendment, Chapter II, the Bill of Rights and
the Judges, from Confronting Injustice-the Edmond Calm Reader, at 86-104, 102-
103 (Little Brown 1966). Also published in 65 Yale L. J. 464 (1956).
36 Justice Black dissenting in Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944).
37 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Black's opinion in Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517(1946) and dissenting opinions in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 268-270, 274-
275 (1952); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951).
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as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to
be properly informed their information must be uncensored.
38
This opinion is in striking contrast to Black's dissent in Tinker. What
might have been the education of the inhabitants of the Alabama com-
pany town-high school, or perhaps eighth grade? Could their distaste for
the particular religious literature have been less great than the distaste of
the majority of Des Moines High School students for black armbands, or
of Shaw High School students for buttons of one kind or another? In
Marsh, Justice Black was concerned about keeping the avenues of com-
munication open, even to those who did not at the moment choose to
listen. It may be wondered what the Justice's response in Tinker, might
have been, had an archaic theory of education not been paramount.
Conclusion
The Guzick case, on appeal, raises important questions. Certainly
not least important is the right of the other students to listen, and the
obligation to learn to live without violence with the "multitude of
tongues." When can that lesson be learned, if not now?
38 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
Jan. 1970
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